thrust state and federal interests into apparent conflict with respect to the federal enforcement of the habeas corpus writ, a conflict accentuated by the Warren Court's expansive push to protect civil liberties. Because of this tension, and a history of judicial discretion in the interpretation of the habeas corpus writ, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a substantive and consistent solution to the problem presented by the federal review of habeas corpus claims that are defaulted in state court. Where the Court has felt the need to change its analyses it has done so-even though the statutory grant of jurisdiction has remained largely unchanged'-by reasoning that it has always employed interpretive freedom in habeas corpus cases to "back and fill" its employment of the writ. 6 A procedural default occurs in the habeas corpus context when a state prisoner has "exhaust [ed] his state remedies without obtaining any decision on the merits of his federal constitutional claim because he has failed to comply with state procedural rules on how the claim must be raised." ' Such defaults usually involve traditional "make it or waive it" defenses, such as contemporaneous objection rules, in which appeals are forfeited if not made in a timely fashion. The procedural default/habeas corpus issue has not lent itself easily to doctrinal analysis since its resolution, as characterized by the Supreme Court, is thought necessarily to involve a conflict between two important governmental interests: providing a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights and reinforcing the procedural integrity of state criminal justice systems. 8 I For the text of the modern statute, see 28 USC § 2254 28 USC § (1982 which provides, in relevant parts:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. (b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. (c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
I Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 411-412 (1963 [56:263
Habeas Corpus
The current law governing procedural defaults was articulated by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v Sykes. 9 In Wainwright, the Court found the state procedural interest paramount, holding that the failure to comply with a state procedural rule will bar federal habeas corpus review unless the defendant can show cause for his failure to comply with the rule in question and actual prejudice occasioned by any default.
This "cause and prejudice" rule is premised largely upon the belief that a state procedural rule deserves a fair amount of respect "both for the fact that it is employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system and for the many interests which it serves in its own right." 10 This reasoning, however, virtually ignores the countervailing federal interests that are at the heart of Reconstruction federalism and that underlie the availability of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over the claims of state prisoners. In addition, this analysis incorrectly characterizes the governmental interests involved as being directly in conflict. The governmental interests are in tension, but they do not actually conflict since the habeas corpus statute, by its own terms, trumps the state interests.
In 1986, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Murray v Carrier, attempted to provide a more coherent framework for the analysis of procedurally defaulted habeas claims by asserting that "the withholding of federal habeas jurisdiction for certain procedurally defaulted claims is a form of abstention." 1 Justice Brennan had used this characterization many years previously in Fay v Noia 2 , where he described certain early federal habeas cases in which the Court declined to interfere with an ongoing state proceeding as fashioning "a doctrine of abstention, whereby full play would be allowed the States in the administration of their criminal justice without prejudice to federal rights enwoven in the state proceedings."," This comment discusses the merits of Justice Brennan's position, using general abstention principles as a framework for analyzing whether federal courts should decline to review state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims.
Section I of the comment traces the development of the Su-' 433 US 72 (1977) . 10 Id at 88. 1 477 US 478, 518 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) . See also Kuhlmann v Wilson, 477 US 436, 465 n 3 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) .
12 372 US at 391. Id at 419 and n 28, noting that this doctrine, "with refinements," was eventually codified as the exhaustion requirement of 28 USC § 2254(b).
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The University of Chicago Law Review preme Court's "cause and prejudice" standard for evaluating state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims. Section II outlines a number of federal abstention doctrines and posits a model of federal abstention based on interest analysis. Section III characterizes the various federal and state interests involved in the state procedural default of federal claims and measures those interests against developed abstention standards.
In concluding, the comment argues that, based upon an interest analysis dictated by federal doctrine, abstention is unwarranted in the context of procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims. Any governmental interest, state or federal, in fostering the procedural integrity of criminal trials does not overcome the heavy presumption against a federal court's "virtually unflagging obligation" 14 to exercise civil rights jurisdiction granted by Congress. Extension of the habeas corpus writ to the claims of state prisoners was designed to ensure the availability of a federal forum for the review of federal claims that might otherwise be treated with hostility by state courts. Given the importance of this interest, the federal courts do not have sufficient reason to balance away the federal policy implicit in this jurisdictional command, even to ensure that the integrity of state procedural rules will not be undermined.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE "CAUSE AND PREJUDICE" STANDARD
As noted above, the procedural default of a habeas corpus claim occurs when a state prisoner fails to comply with a state procedural rule, the consequence of which is that his federal claim never gets heard in state court. The procedural default/habeas corpus problem is thought to implicate two important, and competing, governmental interests: providing a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights and reinforcing the procedural integrity of state criminal justice systems. Characterized this way, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the federal courts to satisfy both interests at the same time.
If a federal court, for example, were to lend support to a state procedural rule by declining to hear federal claims that were raised improperly in state court, possible infringements of a prisoner's constitutional rights may go unheard-and uncorrected. If, on the other hand, a federal court were to hear federal claims that had not been properly presented to a state court, the federal court [56:263 might be placed in the position of undermining the integrity of a state's criminal justice process and wasting scarce judicial resources. In Fay v Noia," 5 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve definitively this question of "under what circumstances, if any, the failure of a state prisoner to comply with a state procedural requirement, as a result of which the state courts decline to pass on the merits of his federal defense, bars subsequent resort to the federal courts for relief on habeas corpus. ' 16 Previous to Fay, the question of whether federal habeas corpus review was available over state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims was analyzed under the "independent and adequate" state ground doctrine of federal jurisdiction. The independent and adequate state ground doctrine originated in the landmark case of Murdock v Memphis. 17 In Murdock, the Supreme Court held that a federal court did not have appellate jurisdiction to review a state case-even if the case presented a federal question-as long as there was an independent and adequate state ground that supported the state court's decision. The holding in Murdock, however, only applied to state substantive law, not to the enforcement of state procedural rules. The Murdock Court left open the question of whether a procedural default constituted an "independent and adequate" state ground, thereby possibly eliminating the availability of either direct or collateral federal review.
The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative in Brown v Allen, holding that the "failure to use a state's available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity... bars federal habeas corpus."' 18 The Brown opinion noted specifically that "the state's procedure for relief must be employed in order to avoid the use of federal habeas corpus as a matter of procedural routine to review state criminal rulings. "' 9 In Irvin v Dowd,' 20 the Supreme Court, rather than directly applying the rule in Brown, avoided using the adequate state ground analysis in the procedural default context. The Irvin majority evaded the issue by reading an ambiguous state court decision as "resting the judgment on the holding that the petitioner's constitutional claim is without merit,"'" rather than finding that a proce- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review dural default constituted an adequate state ground. According to the Irvin majority, the state court had ruled "that the petitioner's constitutional claim [was] without merit. '22 Hence, the Court ruled that there had been no procedural default. Four dissenters in Irvin, however, believed that an adequate state procedural ground sufficient to bar direct review by the Supreme Court was also sufficient to bar habeas corpus review. Because the Irvin majority appeared to back away from the holding in Brown, the question of how to analyze procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims was left unsettled.
The Supreme Court resolved the procedural default/habeas corpus question, at least temporarily, in Fay v Noia, rejecting as "unsound in principle, as well as not supported by authority, the suggestion that the federal courts are without power to grant habeas relief.., because of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent ground of state decision." 23 In a clear move away from Brown, 24 the Court said that the adequate state ground doctrine was "not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal habeas statute " since the "adequate state-ground rule [was] a function of the limitations of appellate review. ' 26 In Fay, the Supreme Court categorically refused to concede jurisdictional significance to a state procedural default, asserting instead that the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts was established simply by the allegation of unconstitutional restraint; of detention simpliciter The Supreme Court found support for its conclusion in three sources: (1) in the nature of the writ of habeas corpus at common law; (2) in the language and purpose of the original Habeas Corpus Act of February 5, 1867; and (3) In Fay, the state interest in barring the federal habeas review of procedural defaults was characterized as procedural. The federal interest, however, was characterized as both procedural and substantive; as the enforcement of substantive federal law in a federal forum. Thus, under this characterization, the combination of federal interests trumped the state procedural interests. The Court in Fay noted, however, that although the independent and adequate state ground doctrine did not limit the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the federal courts still possessed the judicial discretion to "deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies."'" This "limited" discretion was based largely upon the recognition "that the exigencies of federalism warrant a limitation whereby the federal judge has the discretion to deny relief to one who has deliberately sought to subvert or evade the orderly adjudication of his federal defenses in the state courts.
3 2 The Supreme Court derived the judicial discretion to decline review of federal claims that had been intentionally defaulted in the state court from several sources: (1) from discretion allegedly inherent in the habeas corpus statute, since the statute allows federal judges, after granting the writ and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, to "dispose of the matter as law and 29 Id at 424.
'o Id at 426-27 (emphasis added). Compare the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan (in which Justices Clark and Stewart joined) which complained that through the Fay decision "the Court has turned its back on history and struck a heavy blow at the foundations of our federal system." Id at 449. Justice Harlan believed that a procedural default constituted an independent and adequate state ground. Thus, for him, the federal courts in such cases were without the power to take jurisdiction of a habeas claim under such circumstances.
', Id at 438. S2 Id at 433.
justice require"; 3 3 (2) from the equitable nature of the habeas corpus writ; and (3) from precedent, in particular from the exercise of judicial discretion that had been used to develop the habeas exhaustion requirement now codified at 28 USC § 2254 (b) (1982).", As soon as the Supreme Court adopted the Fay rule, it began to back away from it. This shift was nothing new to habeas corpus jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has always felt fairly free to rethink its habeas positions and to use discretion in its interpretation of the scope of the writ as well as in its assertion of collateral habeas corpus jurisdiction. 5 But this perception of judicial freedom has not produced settled habeas corpus doctrine, a fact noted with candor by the Court in Fay: "We do not suggest that this Court has always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our development of the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seemingly, with some --28 USC § 2243 (1982).
3 Fay, 372 US at 438. This reliance on precedent is a form of bootstrapping. The Supreme Court's assertion of judicial discretion in another context of habeas corpus jurisdiction does not mean that the exercise of such discretion was legitimate when used. Nor does it necessarily support the inference that Congress's acquiescence in, and eventual codification of, the exhaustion requirement changes congressional intent with respect to the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction generally (as viewed in the context of Reconstruction federalism) or in the procedural default context particularly.
35 Historically, the writ of habeas corpus was available only for jurisdictional defects. See Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederick William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law 586 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1968). The decision of even a corrupt court, for example, would be upheld so long as the court in question had jurisdiction to decide the case. Professor Hart described the original use of the writ nicely:
The habeas corpus court, of course, could inquire into the competence of the tribunal-that is, its jurisdiction-to enter the judgment of conviction as well as into the question whether the judgment which it had entered authorized the detention. But once these inquiries were satisfied the function of the writ ... was at an end. If the rules distributing authority to make decisions had been complied with, in other words, an antecedent violation of the rules governing the decision to be made was immaterial. backing and filling." 6 The Court's movement away from the "deliberate bypass" rule promulgated in Fay began with its decision in Davis v United States. 7 In Davis, a federal prisoner sought to challenge, for the first time on federal habeas corpus review, the composition of the grand jury that had indicted him. The Supreme Court interpreted the congressional intent behind the adoption of Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that such challenges be made "by motion before trial," to control on collateral habeas review. 3 8 Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal procedural default-absent a showing of cause for relief from the waiver (a standard embodied in the text of the rule) and actual prejudice occasioned by any default (an implied standard)-precluded federal collateral habeas corpus review. 9 Because the Court in Davis did not deal with the effect of a failure to follow a state procedural rule, it effectively left the Fay holding intact. In Francis v Henderson,"° however, the Supreme Court departed dramatically from the Fay Court's "deliberate bypass" rule. In Francis, the Court extended the Davis "cause and prejudice" requirements of Federal Rule 12(b)(2) to cover the state procedural default of the same kind of claim that had been defaulted in Davis (i.e., the failure to challenge grand jury composition by motion before trial). The Court reasoned that, although the federal courts had power to assert federal habeas jurisdiction in such a case, "considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice" 41 require that the Court give no "greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants. To hold otherwise would reflect an anomalous and erroneous view of federalstate relations. '42 Thus, a concern for a comity grounded in federalism runs through both the Fay and Francis procedural default tests. In Francis, however, the facilitation of an ordered system of "' 372 US at 411-412. 37 411 US 233 (1973) .
It is important to note, however, that congressional intent with respect to the extension of the rule's preclusive effect to collateral review was not clear. Rather, the Supreme Court found "it inconceivable that Congress ... intended to perversely negate the Rule's purpose by permitting an entirely different but much more liberal requirement of waiver in federal habeas proceedings." In the absence of direct intent, the Court interpreted the "necessary effect" of the congressional adoption of the Rule. Id at 242. 
The University of Chicago Law Review criminal justice is coupled with comity concerns to create a set of state interests that trump the federal policy implicit in the extension of collateral habeas corpus jurisdiction to the claims of state petitioners.
In Wainwright v Sykes, the Court extended its application of "cause and prejudice" test developed in Davis and Francis to state contemporaneous objection rules. 4 3 The Wainwright Court found that the Fay "deliberate bypass" standard did not accord enough respect to the state's contemporaneous objection rule, a procedural rule which deserved deference "both for the fact that [the rule] is employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system and for the many interests which it serves in its own right."
44
In Wainwright, the Court also seemed to change its mind with respect to the appropriateness of the "independent and adequate state ground" analysis of procedural defaults that was rejected in Fay. The Wainwright Court held that the defendant's "failure to timely object to [the] admission [of his confession] amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have prevented direct review [to the Supreme Court]."" The Supreme Court, however, went on in Wainwright to decide the case based on the state interests in having contemporaneous-objection rules enforced noting that "there was power in the federal courts to entertain an application in such cases. '' 4 e The most startling difference between the Fay and Wainwright analyses lies in the divergent ways the Supreme Court characterized and weighed the different sovereign interests involved in the case of a state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claim. In Fay, the importance of having a federal forum for the enforcement of federal rights trumped the reinforcement of state procedural rules. But, under such a balance, the federal courts still had the discretion to decline to take jurisdiction of federal claims that had been intentionally defaulted at the state level. In Wainwright, 4-433 US 72 (1977) . There is still some doubt as to whether Fay was specifically overruled by Wainwright. In Wainwright, the Supreme Court said only that "[ilt is the sweeping language of Fay v Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today reject." 433 US at 87-88. The Court also noted in a footnote that it had "no occasion today to consider the Fay rule as applied to the facts there confronting the Court" and specifically left the question for "another day." Id at 88 n 12.
" 433 US at 88. In Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 496 (1986) , the Court noted, however, that "[in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default."
45 433 US at 87. " 433 US at 84.
[56:263 however, the federal policy of ensuring the enforcement of federal rights in a federal forum was outweighed by comity concerns attending collateral review by a coordinate jurisdiction and by state interests, such as finality and reliability, thought to be fostered by the rigid enforcement of state procedural rules. The Supreme Court in Wainwright did not want to waive state procedural defaults, in part, because it thought nonenforcement would tend to detract from "the trial of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event. ' 4 7 Given the Francis analysis as precedent, the Wainwright Court had little trouble recharacterizing and reweighing the various interests involved, noting, as it had in Fay, the "Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where that statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged. ' 48 This judicial discretion has given the Supreme Court little need to fully explain its changing and growing emphases upon the importance of federalism and the integrity of state criminal procedure.
In Wainwright, the Court deliberately left the meaning of "cause and prejudice" to be defined in future decisions.
5 0 Subsequent cases have refined the standard. 5 1 For purposes of providing a coherent structure to the procedural default/habeas corpus problem, the most important of these cases is Murray v Carrier. 52 In Murray, the Supreme Court held that "cause for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim." 53 Thus, attorney inadvertence does not constitute "cause" 433 US at 90. 477 US 478 (1986) . The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case relating to the preclusive effect of a procedural default in cases where a state ignores its own procedural default and decides the merits of a petitioner's constitutional claim(s) anyway. Harris v Reed, 822 F2d 684 (7th Cir 1987) , cert granted in part, 108 S Ct 1107 108 S Ct (1988 . This case has some important implications for the procedural default problem, since if a state waives its own procedural default it must not value the integrity of its procedural rules very highly.
-2 477 US 478 (1986) . 53 Id at 492.
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under this holding. The Murray opinion also emphasized many of the same state procedural concerns, on comity grounds, that the Court had found so persuasive in Wainwright, noting that the costs of federal review to the state included a reduction in the finality of litigation and the frustration of "'both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.'" 54 The "cause and prejudice" rule validated in Wainwright v Sykes is a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, grounded in comity and the exercise of judicial discretion. The rule is designed to minimize federal/state tensions occasioned by the collateral review of state court decisions. Since the procedural default/habeas corpus problem raises federalism issues thought to require judicial deference in the name of comity, Justice Brennan argued in Murray that "the withholding of federal habeas jurisdiction for certain procedurally defaulted habeas claims is a form of abstention." 55 The federal abstention doctrines, as developed to date, are also judicially created, comity based prudential limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Federal abstention, however, is a more doctrinally mature area of federal jurisdiction than the relatively discrete problem of procedural default in the habeas corpus context. 56 As a form of abstention, the "cause and prejudice" test of Wainwright should be analyzed by the comparatively well structured parameters of federal abstention doctrine, by principles normally used to analyze and guide the allocation of judicial power between state and federal governments. The federal abstention doctrines are outlined below.
II. THE FEDERAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
Since 1941, the Supreme Court has created a series of "abstention" doctrines, grounded in equity, through which the federal courts decline to exercise their statutory jurisdiction when the ex- Abstention, 19 Ga L Rev 1097 , 1122 -25 (1985 . Since the abstention doctrines have been accepted by the federal courts (and, arguably, by Congress), however, this comment proceeds under an assumption of their viability, if not their validity.
[56:263
Habeas Corpus ercise of such jurisdiction appears unwise. Though the Court has identified several types of federal abstention, they are all premised on two basic themes: a desire to avoid premature constitutional adjudication and a regard for preserving the appropriate lines of federal/state relations. Throughout the development of all the abstention doctrines, however, there has been considerable disagreement as to when state interests rise to such a level of importance that federal courts should defer to them in the name of proper federal/ state relations.
The Supreme Court first articulated the concept of federal abstention in Railroad Comm 'n v Pullman Co. 57 , in which a Texas railway regulation was challenged on grounds of racial discrimination under both state and federal law. The meaning of the relevant Texas statute-namely, the scope of "unjust discrimination"-had not been definitively interpreted by the state supreme court. Thus, the Supreme Court in Pullman "abstained" from hearing the case, reasoning that
[i]n this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication."'
The Pullman Court intended federal abstention to be an equitable doctrine "appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. ' "" The Court recognized that "[t]his use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction on those powers. ' 60 Hence, from the beginning, abstention has been a judge made doctrine that operates, in the name of federalism, as a prudential limitation on fed-57 312 US 496 (1941) . 58 Id at 500 (citations omitted). Id at 501, citing Cavanaugh v Looney, 248 US 453, 457 (1919) and DiGiovanni v Camden Ins. Assn., 296 US 64, 73 (1935) .
5,
60 Id at 501 (emphasis added).
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In Burford v Sun Oil Co. 1 , the Supreme Court articulated another form of federal abstention, also grounded in comity and federalism. In Burford, the plaintiff brought a diversity suit in federal court to challenge the validity of a state administrative order that regulated the production of oil and natural gas within the state. Because the conservation and regulation of these resources involved complex technical issues, and because the state had provided for thorough judicial review, in part by specialized courts, a plurality of the Court held that a federal court having jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state administrative order may, in its sound discretion .
'refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest'; for it 'is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy. ' 62 In practice, this means that the federal courts must be careful not to interfere with state administrative schemes for fear of making technical errors on state regulatory questions, and for fear of unduly intruding into state affairs. Justice Frankfurter dissented from the plurality opinion in Burford on the grounds that the congressional premise of the statutory (diversity) jurisdiction at issue "is that the possibility of unfairness against outside litigants is to be avoided by providing the neutral forum of a federal court." 6 4 By abstaining, he reasoned, "[t]he Court today is in effect withdrawing this grant of jurisdiction in order to avoid the possible unfairness against state interests in the federal courts. That which Congress created to assure impartiality of adjudication is now destroyed .. [56:263
prosecutions. The Younger decision outlined the foundations of federal abstention, grounding the doctrine in the "basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National Government" 67 as well as in the dictates of federalism:
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings has never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief... This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. 8
Justice Douglas dissented in Younger, presenting arguments similar to those made by Justice Frankfurter in his Burford dissent. Given the Younger context, Douglas grounded his argument in the history of Reconstruction federalism itself:
[w]hatever the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism prior to the Civil War, they were fundamentally altered by the war. The Civil War Amendments made civil rights a national concern. Those amendments, especially § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, cemented the change in American federalism brought on by the war. Congress immediately commenced to use its new powers to pass legislation . ... [T] he Reconstruction statutes, including the enlargement of federal jurisdiction, represent a later view of American federalism. 9 The structural changes wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments animate the general dispute about the propriety of federal abstention with respect to the exercise of civil rights juris- 73 The dissent argued that abstention was improper when the plaintiff challenged statutes intended to inhibit racial integration. Clinging strongly to the premises of Reconstruction federalism, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, argued that "[w]hen used widespread, [abstention] dilutes the stature of the Federal District Courts, making them secondary tribunals in the administration of justice under the Federal Constitution." 74 Such dilution was improper, the dissent believed, because the availability of federal review over constitutional claims was meant to provide uniform and authoritative federal law and because deference to state policy bent on the nullification of federal rights was unwarranted. 75 The Supreme Court's focus on comity as the most essential component in the balance of federal/state interests for federal abstention purposes has allowed to Court to expand the equitable doctrine of abstention to cover suits seeking damages as well as those seeking equitable relief. 76 Habeas Corpus noted with approval that considerations of comity and federalism are "too important to be made dependent on ancient distinctions about the powers of the several courts at Westminster Hall, and the ability of a federal court to defer to a state in a proper case ought not to depend on whether the case is thought of as 'legal' or 'equitable.' ,,7
There has been considerable disagreement among courts and scholars as to how many kinds of federal abstention there are. s The number of abstention doctrines, however, makes little difference since classification of the abstention doctrines is simply an exercise in taxonomy that depends upon variations in procedural posture, factual content, and the complexity of state interests. 9 Regardless of how abstention is divided, "the basic interests involved remain fundamentally the same: these are the interests of comity and federalism, and they wend their way through the cases in all the permutations which a litigious society can generate." 8 0 From all the above, it is possible to assemble a general model of federal abstention. Because federal abstention acts to restrict congressionally mandated jurisdiction, application of the doctrine is exceptional and should be invoked only where significant state interests outweigh corresponding federal interests: The premise of federal abstention, a doctrine that tries to minimize federal/state tensions occasioned by the availability of federal review, is comity-a respect for state interests out of deference to state sovereignty. But, the degree of respect due state interests must be determined by the relative strengths and merits of the state and federal interests involved. Hence, abstention is premised on a form of governmental interest analysis.
III. THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ABSTENTION STANDARDS TO

STATE PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS
The "cause and prejudice" test of Wainwright v Sykes allows federal courts, within their discretion and in the name of comity, to decline habeas corpus jurisdiction in cases of state procedural default. It is thus a form of abstention and, as such, should be tested against developed abstention standards to determine whether such deference to state interests is either necessary or appropriate in the procedural default/habeas corpus context. An abstention-based interest analysis of state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims must evaluate, compare, and balance the interests of comity and federalism against the need to vindicate federal constitutional rights in a federal forum.
As noted in the previous section, there has long been debate about the legitimacy of abstention in contexts where state prejudices are thought to run high. The dissents in Burford, Harrison, and Younger all make points about the importance of the availability of federal jurisdiction in contexts where state biases have long been regarded as a threat to justice. The federal diversity jurisdiction at issue in Burford was designed to counter a state preference for its own citizens in suits between its own citizens and [56:263 citizens of another state. In Harrison the problem was the state legislature's nullification of civil rights laws. In Younger, hostility to the exercise of unpopular constitutional rights served as a backdrop for determining the propriety of enjoining a pending state criminal proceeding. Similarly, a mistrust of state court processes lies behind the availability of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over the claims of state petitioners.
Given the concern over state prejudices, the federal interests inherent in the existence of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction make federal abstention unwarranted in cases of state procedural default. Federal abstention in the procedural default/habeas corpus context cannot be justified as a form of Pullman, Burford, or Younger abstention.
8 2 Moreover, although the Supreme Court can create additional pockets of federal abstention in circumstances where it feels that judicial deference in the name of comity is more prudent than the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the governmental interests involved in the procedural default/habeas corpus problem do not allow for judicial deference to state interests in the name of some new and independent form of abstention.
A. Judicial Deference to State Interests in the Procedural Default/Habeas Corpus Context Cannot Be Justified As Any Recognized Form of Abstention
The Irrelevance of Pullman Abstention
The declination to review procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims cannot be justified as a form of Pullman abstention. Pullman abstention is premised upon the avoidance of both premature constitutional adjudication and unnecessary federal/state friction. In the state procedural default context neither of these concerns exists. After a state decision has been rendered and the federal defense has been defaulted, there is little danger that the federal court's decision on collateral habeas review will merely be an advisory opinion, or in Pullman terms, an unnecessary constitutional decision. s Further, since the only issues of state law have already been decided, there can be no concern as to how a state will interpret its substantive law. Rather, the only state law that "' As noted, classification of the abstention doctrines is generally an exercise in taxonomy. For purposes of exposition, this comment will use the three most common forms of abstention.
03 Justice Brennan made this point in Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 518 n 1 (1987) (Brennan dissenting).
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review might occasion any federal/state tension in the context of a procedural default is, by definition, procedural, and has already been employed by the state. Likewise, there is no problem of avoiding unnecessary friction between the state and federal sovereigns in cases where a federal claim has been defaulted in state court. This is not to say that there is no friction attending the federal release of a state prisoner. Rather, this friction is not "unnecessary" (a Pullman concern) because it is an unavoidable consequence of the habeas corpus statute itself. As Professor Yackle notes, "the institutional settings of state and federal courts make it imperative that the latter have the final word on federal issues." ' Indeed, the modern habeas corpus statute contemplates federal relitigation of habeas claims on several levels. First, 28 USC § 2245(b) provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner shall not be granted unless that prisoner has exhausted available state remedies." 5 Thus, federal review is meant to be available as an additional layer of judicial review after exhaustive state court litigation. Second, 28 USC § 2254(d) provides for extensive relitigation of certain factual questions decided in state court. 86 Moreover, the Court in Brown v Allen held that state decisions on habeas corpus claims do not act as res judicata on federal review. 8 7 In Fay v Noia, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts had a "limited discretion" to decline review in cases of procedural default where the petitioner had deliberately sought to subvert or evade state processes, in part, because 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982) allows federal judges, after granting the writ and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require.""" But, the equitable discretion found in the text of the statute relates to the substantive scope of the writ, and not to the initial assertion of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Judicial discretion to dispose of the case is granted only after granting the writ, or asserting jurisdiction. Hence, any "equity" inherent in the statute seems to speak to remedy, not to the denial of jurisdiction. 8 9 , Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991, 1058 (1985 .
For text of 28 USC § 2254(b), see note 5.
See 28 USC §2254(d) (1)-(8).
81 344 US 443, 458, 460-65 (1953) . Fay, 372 US at 438. 88 Also, there has been considerable controversy surrounding the scope of the habeas statute. It is unclear whether the statute is coextensive with the scope of the writ at common law. Hence, any discretion inherent in the writ at common law may not necessarily [56:263
Habeas Corpus
The case of Ex parte Royall provides some measure of contemporaneous support for this interpretation. The Royall case was decided in 1885, eighteen years after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Between 1868 and 1885, however, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide habeas corpus claims on direct review.90 The case thus stands as the first authoritative treatment of the habeas corpus statute in its original form. In the Royall case, the Supreme Court held that the requirement "to dispose of the party as law and justice require ... does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it." 91 For the Royall Court, the assertion of federal jurisdiction was not a question of whether, but of when. The federal courts did not have the power to decline jurisdiction altogether, even though its exercise would engender federal/state conflict. The Royall Court noted that after the state court decided a case in question, the federal habeas court could either wait to allow the highest state court to hear the claim or could hear the claim in federal court on habeas review (an option now precluded by the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b)). e2 Thus, the federal court could wait to review the federal claim, but it was not allowed to wait forever. Instead, the federal court was held to have the discretion to delay review in order to minimize tensions between the federal and state governments. This delay does less violence to the federal interests inherent in habeas corpus jurisdiction than the "cause and prejudice" test of Wainwright v Sykes, which denies federal review completely in cases of procedural default unless cause and prejudice can be shown for the default.
Moreover, the modern statute requires that, upon application, a judge must award the writ or issue an order directing "the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 9 " Any judicial discretion that exists exist in the statute. See, for example, Wainwright v Sykes: "For more than a century since the 1867 amendment, this Court has grappled with the relationship between the classical common-law writ of habeas corpus and the remedy provided in 28 USC § 2254." 433 US at 78.
, From 1868 to 1885 jurisdiction to decide habeas claims had been removed by Congress. to decline habeas jurisdiction might be thought to come from these words instead of from the language referring to disposition "as law and justice require." Rule 4 of the rules governing enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts, however, compels a different interpretation. The Advisory Committee note to the rule explains that the purpose of the "not entitled thereto" language is to place a duty on the federal court to screen out "frivolous" applications from habeas review. 4 Presumably, "frivolous" in this context means claims by prisoners who are not being held in custody (within the meaning of the statute) or claims of federal law that have already been rejected on the merits. It would have to be a stretch of the language to conclude that an undetermined constitutional claim, as in the case of a procedural default, is "frivolous."
Besides the structure and text of the habeas corpus statute, the legislative purpose behind the extension of the habeas corpus writ, when viewed in its historical context, also shows clearly that federal/state conflict is not "unnecessary" within the meaning of the Pullman abstention doctrine. Extension of the writ in 1867 was necessary to protect federal rights from underenforcement and nullification by the states. 9 5 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, for example, was presaged by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1833.96 This 1833 Act served as "dramatic precedent for using the writ to enforce unpopular federal laws in the states. ,01 It could be argued that federal/state friction is no longer "necessary" since the risk of state hostility to federal constitutional rights is not as great as it was during Reconstruction. This argument must be rejected for two reasons. First, the determination that federal habeas jurisdiction should be expansive was made by Congress (pursuant to constitutional authority) and this decision has not been superseded by a later judgment of that body. More importantly, though, the risk of state nullification, while perhaps dormant, is still present. Note the resistance to the enforcement of desegregation as evidenced in cases such as Harrison v N.A.A.C.P., 360 US 167 (1959) . In fact, the Supreme Court has recently noted that not all state court judges have been especially sensitive to the protection of those constitutional rights that make criminal convictions more difficult to obtain. See Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 493 n 35 (1976 Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863 -1875 , 13 Am J Legal Hist 333 (1969 .
While the Reconstruction era has long passed, the structure of Reconstruction federalism remains viable as "there has been no alteration of the congressional intent to make the
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The University of Chicago Law Review not "unnecessary" to the enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus. Because there is no possibility of premature constitutional adjudication in the case of a state procedural default and because concerns over federal/state conflict were specifically rejected by the grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction, Pullman abstention is not an appropriate method for dealing with the procedural default of such claims.
The Irrelevance of Burford Abstention
The declination to review procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims cannot be justified as a form of Burford abstention either. The Burford decision was premised primarily upon a desire to avoid technical error in deciding state regulatory questions and an attendant worry about the possible frustration of state regulatory policy. In Burford, the complicated state administrative scheme involved the regulation of oil and gas. In Alabama Public Service Comm'n v Southern Ry. Co., 0 4 the Supreme Court took Burford a step farther, denying federal review over a question that concerned the regulation of intrastate railroad service on the grounds that the determination of such rates was a local concern.
The policies behind Burford abstention are inapplicable to the problem of state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims because the scheme at issue in a procedural default is the procedural structure of a state's criminal justice system. A system of criminal procedure is not especially complex. At least, it is no more complex than a comparable federal system. Since the state procedural rule has already been applied, there can be no problem of technical error over complex local issues. Instead, federal review of procedurally defaulted claims amounts to a rejection of the state rule. While it is true that there may be some frustration of state policy in disregarding a state procedural default, any frustration comes from the availability of federal relief on habeas corpus and is a byproduct of the.habeas statute itself.
The Irrelevance of Younger Abstention
Younger abstention, with its direct focus upon comity and upon the federal interest in having independently functioning federal courts the primary protector of the legal rights secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts." Harrison, 360 US at 181 n * (1959) (Douglas dissenting).
states, appears at first glance to provide the correct abstention model for use in resolving the procedural default/habeas corpus problem. In Fay, Francis, and Wainwright, the Supreme Court relied on some conception of comity to bar the hearing of habeas claims that had not been heard in state court due to procedural default. But federal law is paramount under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 1 0 5 Hence, "federal law operates of its own force upon and within the states and does not depend upon the willingness of state authorities to accept it." 108 Moreover, as Professor Althouse has noted, " [s] tates are not inviolable spheres of sovereignty." They "cannot claim an entitlement to separateness" because a state has only that power which remains after Congress has finished exercising its own Article I power.
107 Consequently, "comity" in the context of federal/state relations is not a comity of co-equal, but of coordinate sovereigns. This is not to say that the Constitution demands federal jurisdiction over all collateral state claims, but that supremacy must be an element in the balance of state and federal interests.
Additional supremacy parallels can be drawn to federal decisions on state "door-closing" statutes. Even under the Erie doctrine, 10 8 a federal court can hear a federal claim regardless of the fact that a state court has validly closed its doors (much like the effect of a procedural default) to such a suit. 109 In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft, Inc.,'" for example, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the policy embodied in the state "door-closing" statute (which precluded suits brought against a foreign corporation by nonresidents unless the cause of action arose within the state) was outweighed, in part, by the federal policy of avoiding discrimination in state court and the policy of maximum enforcement of the rights of coordinate sovereigns. The same arguments can be made in the procedural default context. (1947) (where the state court has closed its doors to a particular kind of suit, a similar suit is barred in a federal court on diversity since the federal court must follow the policy of the forum state). But note Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 469 (1965) (distinguishing a case where "application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery."). 
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With respect to the abstention of procedurally defaulted habeas corpus claims, the use of judicial discretion to restrict federal jurisdiction on comity grounds is especially inappropriate. As noted above, a "scrupulous regard""' for state independence was specifically undermined by the extension of federal habeas corpus review to the claims of state prisoners during Reconstruction." 2 The federal interest involves a "clear congressional policy of affording a federal forum for the determination of the federal claims of state criminal defendants .... ."11' Hence, deference in the name of comity, and Younger abstention, has been implicitly rejected by the policies underlying the congressional grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners." 4 In Ex parte Royall, the Court held that comity dictated that the federal courts should wait to hear a federal claim until the state proceeding was over, but the federal court still had the power to discharge a state prisoner from custody. In Royall, comity was thought to be prudent because the states are also charged with the duty to protect federal rights. In addition, the federal government could always intervene later, if necessary. However, if a state procedural default is given effect in federal court, the federal government will not be in a position to protect a prisoner's constitutional rights later since the constitutional claim will never be heard. The denial of jurisdiction is different from a delay in the exercise of jurisdiction. The denial of jurisdiction completely compromises the federal interests in the enforcement of federal rights in a federal forum.
There are two additional reasons why Younger does not provide a perfect model for abstaining in the procedural default/ habeas corpus context. First, the procedural posture in Younger abstention cases is crucial. As a result of Younger, the federal courts are not generally allowed to enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding. This holding does not speak to whether federal courts can hear federal claims after all state proceedings have been exhausted, as on habeas review. The intrusion into state interests is I" Pullman, 312 US at 501. 112 The extension of the protection of habeas corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners was passed at the peak of Radical Republican power. As an additional avenue of review independent of direct Supreme Court review, it was designed to fight resistance to Reconstruction and help enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. See Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 415-417 (1963) .
Id at 418, citing Ex parte Royall, 117 US at 253.
